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Introduction 
Over the past seventeen years, the textile industry 
in the United States has experienced many changes which 
have been a result of a combination of economic, 
governmental, and international factors. North Carolina 
is the home to over 1200 of the nation's estimated 6000 
textile companies which have been tremendously affected 
by the metamorphosis of this industry. The reliance of 
North Carolina's economic stability on this industry 
merits a serious study. 
The first issue that one must address is "What were 
the effects of this period on North Carolina textiles?" 
North Carolina's textile industry was characterized by 
greater reductions in profits, lower productivity rates, 
increased declines in employment, shrinking market 
shares, and an overall reduction in sales in certain 
market segments than in any other recent period in 
history. 
In order to imagine the significance of the events 
during this period, one must have a working knowledge of 
the movement of the textile industry from the North to 
the South and the development of this industry in North 
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Carolina. The economic conditions and government 
po1icies~ prevalent during this period~ relative to the 
textile industry~ should be examined on a national level 
since they directly affect North Carolina's industry. 
The import situation~ which also relates to the two 
previously mentioned factors~ is an issue itself that 
will be discussed. An overview of the North Carolina 
textile industry from 1970 to 1987 will be presented 
while focusing on several dominant companies which have 
operating facilities in North Carolina. From an 
accumulation of these separate examinations as well as 
other indications~ a general outlook for the North 
Carolina textile industry will be formulated. At this 
time~ there seems to be a favorabe outlook according to 
public opinion. However~ this assessment of the future 
outlook for the textile industry can only be determined 
accurately by proceeding with this study. 
Historical Perspective 
Although the lack of certain dated records prohibit 
an exact determination of the first textile mill in North 
Carolina~ it can be estimated that it was 1790. However~ 
the development, in any noticeable measure, did not 
-"""""""'1 
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substantially reveal itself until about the year 1880.[1] 
From the beginning in 1790 til 1900 it was a struggle of 
gradually increasing intensity and extension. 
It has also been estimated that manufacturing 
development throughout the South might have been at about 
the same pace as in New England except for the combined 
influence of the invention of the cotton gin, the 
institution of slavery, and the checking of immigration. 
As cotton and slavery advanced, the population of free 
white textile workers resorted to mountain farming, thus, 
many of the white industrial workers of 1800 became the 
poor mountain f~rmers in 1850 and the owners of factories 
who operated with free white labor in 1800 became the 
cotton planters operating with black slave labor.[2] When 
slavery was abolished, the white people who had once 
abandoned the factories, for agriculture went back to 
supplying the labor for manufacturers as their fathers 
had done. 
Even prior to the Civil War, it was evident that the 
South was well on their way toward economic self-
sufficiency as part of a national impulse to break away 
from colonial commerce with England. It was documented 
that on March 4, 1775, in Chowan County, N.C. that a 
community met to encourage manufacturers in that county 
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through incentives. The chairman of the committee 
offered ten pounds sterling to the first producer in a 
certain time of fulled woolen cloth. Although the 
objectives of many offers such as this were political as 
well as industrial, the effect was still the same. The 
textile industry in North Carolina was vital to the 
accomplishment of colonial objectives.[3] 
Most of the manufacturing was domestic rather than 
commercial in the early revolutionary periods. A typical 
cotton planter employed only a few white workers to 
instruct his negroes in spinning and weaving to 
manufacture a small amount of cotton and woolen cloth 
each week. A few plants may have approached a commercial 
character. In 1790, it was related that a "gentleman of 
great mechanical knowledge and instructed in most of the 
branches of cotton manufactures in Europe, has already 
fixed, completed, and now at at work on the high hills of 
useful implements for manufacturing every necessary 
article in cotton", was in business in North Carolina.[4] 
The history of the mills in the thirty years 
following 1810 are not clear. It can be established that 
there was little localization of the industry; there was 
frequent moving from one water power source to another 
with machinery being hauled about. During this period, 
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mill-building for the production of cotton cloth and 
twine coincided with the depressed conditions in the 
markets for raw cotton. For many planters and merchants, 
this provided the readiest means of diversification. 
Twenty mills were recorded as being built in North 
Carolina during the late l820s and early l830s, when 
cotton prices fell below twenty cents a pound. As prices 
for cotton fell below ten cents a pound in the late l830s 
and early l840s, a second period of mill-building 
occurred. At this time, the textile industry in North 
Carolina alone grew to forty-eight thousand spindles, 
even so the concentration was still in New England.[5] 
Although textile manufacture was cut back somewhat 
during the l850s due to a rise in cotton prices which 
redirected investment back into slaves, land, and rail 
transportation, a certain stability had developed. By 
1860, North Carolina had 39 cotton mills, 41,384 
spindles, 761 looms, and 1,764 workers-producing goods 
worth $1,046,000.[6] Inspite of the destruction and 
disorganization brought on by the Civil War, the 
manufacture of textiles in the South continued. By 1870 
the industry had almost recovered to its pre-war levels. 
Between 1870 and 1880, sixteen new mills were built and 
the average number of workers per mill rose by fifty 
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percent. Total production rose from $1.345 million to 
$2.554 million. By 1890, there were forty-nine mills 
owned by the same planter families- Shenk, Fries, Holt, 
Linberger, Morehead, Odell, Leak, Battle, Patterson, 
Cameron, and Murchison - who had owned mills before the 
war. [7] 
In the late 1870's and early 1880's, two obstacles 
for the textile industry were identified. An expansion 
of the industrial labor force into textiles would require 
enormous capital outlays which was not readily available 
within the still small-scale industry. Also, the 
availability of monies from the agricultural proletariat 
did not necessarily guarantee the availability of a 
sufficiently large and capable labor force for textile 
industrialization. 
In order to provide large amounts of capital for 
expansion, both local and external sources were utilized. 
If North Carolina was to compete in national markets, it 
was necessary to acquire the latest in textile machinery. 
After the Civil War, southern entrepreneurs were 
skeptical about investments by northern-owned capital. 
They were convinced that industrialization had to be 
indigenous in origin, or at least appear that way. The 
great majority of cotton mills in the South were built 
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from "the combined capital of many of little means." [8] 
A major promotional effort by the Chambers of 
Commerce, newspapers and industrial "evangelists" 
publicized the benefits of small communities pooling 
their profits and savings to organize cotton mills. 
Investments were presented as a wider campaign for the 
improvement of the South. A typical strategy was for 
local entrepreneurs to raise as much capital as possible 
locally, providing at least enough for a mill, and the 
other basic infrastructural requirements, and then to 
appeal to Northern textile machinery manufacturers to 
provide machinery in return for a share in the stock of 
the newly formed company. Commission agents in New York 
often provided the additional capital needed in return 
for stocks or for being granted the mill's agency 
contract.[9] 
In North Carolina, the rapidly expanding tobacco 
industry also provided capital for textile 
industrialization in a number of ways. For instance, in 
Durham, North Carolina, the first textile mill, the 
Durham Cotton Manufacturing Company, was created in 1884 
with a capital stock of $130,000 which came from Julian 
Carr's interests in a tobacco company. In another 
instance, in 1900, the Hanes Brothers sold their tobacco 
~!':':":;':''''''4£If'''''----------''''--''''---------------------------------------------
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company in Forsyth County to invest in hosiery and 
knitting mills.[lO] 
The formation of a textile working class was another 
major obstacle to industrialization. Workers viewed 
cotton mill labor as temporary work while agriculture was 
between seasons. The fear of disrupting the agricultural 
labor force by creating competition for jobs and the need 
to keep labor costs down in order to be able to compete 
in northern markets ruled out the use of wage increases 
to stabilize the labor force. 

In order to build a stable labor force,the benefits 

of textiles mills were publicized using many of the 
themes developed by New South propagandists since the 
Civil War. The campaign to extend textile production 
after 1880 was presented as an element of' social 
betterment to rehabilitate the "poor white" and protect 
him from the competition of cheap black labor. The mill 
community was soon viewed as a "family". The building of 
a textile labor force also was aided by the widely 
publicized idea "that textile industrialization was a 
part of a larger plan of industrial and agricultural 
diversification in the New South's economic war against 
the North. "[11] Once workers were drawn into the 
textile mills on a permanent basis, the owners recognized 
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the need to keep them there while also reducing the 
threat of unionization. Social and geographical 
isolation of mill communities made this possible. 
Mills were located in very rural areas while company 
housing was provided for families in which every member, 
including children, worked in the mills Mill owners also 
maintained control over the political, economic, and 
spiritual lives of employees through provision and 
control of school, churches, recreational facilities, 
medical facilities, and virtually all aspects of mill 
village life. Textile industrialization continued to 
follow this pattern of rural isolation into the twentieth 
century. 
During the 1920s and 1930s the difference between 
the rates of labor exploitation in the Carolina Piedmont 
and in New England was the crucial factor in the 
relocation of the cotton textile industry to the South. 
By 1939 there were 19.3 million cotton spindles in the 
southern states of which 6.5 million were in North 
Carolina alone as compared to 9.7 million in the whole of 
New England.[12] Relocation permitted a significant 
increase in surplus value through increases in work 
hours, exploitation of women and children, reduced wage 
levels, and increases in worker productivity. The 
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following chart is a comparison of North Carolina to 
Massachusetts which reveals the value added in 1919 and 
1939.[13] 
Table 1 
Cotton Goods Manufacturing: North Carolina and 
Massachussetts, 1919-1939 
(a) (b) b/a Labor Product Value 
Establish- Wage Cost Value Added 
ments Earners 
1919 
N.C. 311 67,297 216 49.1 318.4 131. 6 
Mass. 191 122,499 641 109.9 596.7 237.0 
1939 
N.C. 341 109,795 322 74.9 324.3 165.4 
Mass. 121 37,923 313 31.6 99.3 51.5 
*Va1ues and Costs in millions 
It is not the intent of this study to overlook that 
there were other crucial factors in the relocation of the 
cotton textile industry to the South. Cheapness of 
transportation of raw cotton grown locally, nearness to 
markets for finished goods, economy of power, and even 
the degree of humidity were all competitive advantages 
for the South.[14] During the early relocation to the 
South, 1859-99, New England mills were forced to cut 
production in response to the depression following the 
Panic of 1893 while southern mills continued to operate 
at full capacity. This was largely due to the stable 
foreign markets for the cheap coarse cotton cloth 
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produced in southern mills and the ability to "squeeze" 
their labor with little influence from government 
legislature or unionized workers.[15] Also the 
development and marketing of ring spinning and the 
automatic battery loom in the l890s probably pressured a 
relocation. New England mill owners were not able to 
exploit "cheap labor" or unskilled workers which could 
operate the new machinery with little difficulty. Unless 
the northern manufacturers relocated, they were unable to 
match the southern states'new levels of productivity 
provided by the new machinery. 
By the end of the 1930s the Carolina Peidmont region 
had replaced New England as the center of American cotton 
textile production. This illustrates the developing 
relationship between the North Carolina economy and the 
competitive growth process in a once-labor-intensive 
industry. 
The following half of a century for the textile 
industry in North Carolina proved to be a series of ups 
and downs. The cotton textile industry fell behind in 
the years to come in its ability to compete with newer, 
more capital intensive industries for investment capital. 
As we proceed with this study, we will see how the 
textile industry, once labor intensive, became a capital 
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intensive industry itself. At this point in this 
examination our attention will divert to three major 
factors, beginning in the early 1970s, which have 
impacted the textile industry in North Carolina. 
Economic Conditions Affecting The Textile Industry 
In order to understand the condition of the textile 
industry from 1970 to 1987, the economic factors 
affecting the past and present characteristics of the 
industry must be taken into consideration. The first 
major event was the 1973-1974 recession which in some 
ways hit the industry harder than the recent 1980s 
recession. During the time of the 1973 recession, the 
industry was much more labor intensive than it is now. 
At this same time, the textile industry, which is one of 
the country's top ten consumers of energy, was faced with 
enormous fuel bills when the price of oil was at a record 
high.[16] Coinciding with this recession was a sudden 
shift away from double knits which many companies had 
already heavily invested in. Overall spending on apparel 
and other textile products was low. With increasing 
operating costs and lower sales, earnings were logically 
down also. In 1975, profit in the industry declined 
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sixty-nine percent and the industry recorded an all-time 
low of one percent of sales that year.[17J 
The textile industry was not hit hard by prevailing 
economic conditions in the United States again until the 
early 1980s. According to a Kurt Salmon Associates Inc. 
survey of the textile industry, the recession was a major 
cause of poor performance which is evidenced by a 37% 
decline in operating earnings in 1982 from 1981. The 
forty-eight companies covered in the KSA Textiles Profile 
suffered a 9.3% drop in sales in 1982 versus fiscal 1981. 
Comparatively, net profits for the industry dropped to 
1.5% of sales in 1982, excluding extraordinary items 
totalling $129 million. This poor performance was also 
suffered by textile customers-apparel manufacturers, 
home, and industrial users. Different market segments 
were affected in varying degrees with the fabric 
producers being hit the hardest in part due to 
vulnerability to import competition. Yarn spinners and 
home manufacturers suffered the smallest sales declines 
in 1982 and as we will later investigate, continued to 
suffer the least up until 1987.[18J 
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Import Situation: 1970-1987 
By the end of the 1970s, American textile makers 
found themselves faced with shrinking domestic sales 
largely because of rising imports. As Table 2 in 
Appendix A indicates, U.S. imports of textile and apparel 
products have been on the rise for the majority of the 
years since 1974.[19] Between the years of 1974 and 1978 
there was a steady increase in the amount of imported 
textiles flooding into U.S. domestic markets. Then in 
1979 through 1981 there was a sharp increase of almost 
five billion dollars of textiles each year. The accepted 
explanation for this surge of imports will be discussed 
in the following overview of the policies of the major 
sources of U.S. imports and the United States trade 
policy. 
The phenomenal growth in textile and apparel 
imports from developing countries to the United States 
since 1974 is generally regarded as a result of the 
competitive advantage of low-cost labor maintained in 
these countries.[20J Labor costs can be from thirty to 
forty percent lower in the major overseas textile sources 
than in the United States.[21J However, the view that 
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increasing imports are due to low labor costs alone is 
too simplistic. There are other factors which may play 
as crucial a role in the stimulation of exports of 
developing countries. "Export-led growth" strategies 
which developing countries have adopted in the 1970s and 
1980s are promoted with the intention of generating trade 
surpluses which can be used to finance overall national 
development. National governments of developing 
countries who are major textile sources have provided a 
variety of incentives including direct subsidies, tax 
breaks, soft loans, exemptions from custom duties on 
imported raw materials and manufacturing equipment, and 
export subsidies. For example, in 1979 China shifted its 
industrial development emphasis from heavy industry to 
light and textile industries. The textile industry is 
being given priority access to raw materials, a huge 
amount of investment capital has been channeled into 
textile sectors, and a considerable amount of foreign 
exchange has been allocated to importing textile and 
apparel production equipment. The government of Korea 
designated textiles as a priority sector in 1981 to 
increase export earnings. This has been accomplished 
through the availability of government loans at low 
interest rates and other benefits to the industry. An 
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announcement was made in 1987 by the Korean government 
that a new promotional plan would make Korea "the number 
1 textile exporter in the world by the end of the 
century."[22] 
Cartels, which are illegal in the United States, are 
another factor which stimulates exports of developing 
countries into the United States. In Japan, government-
sanctioned cartels have been implemented in the textile 
and fiber sectors to enable these industries which are 
burdened by excess capacity to survive recessionary 
periods. Cartels are generally implemented in 
conjunction with import sanctions. Cartels also provide 
a "dumping ground" of export markets since they permit 
producers to maintain relatively high prices in their 
protected domestic markets while disposing of surpluses 
overseas at much lower prices.[23] 
While low labor costs still remain a major factor in 
the increase of imports into the United States, export-
led growth strategies and cartels of developing countries 
playa significant role also. From 1974 to 1981, the 
United States' share of total developing country exports 
of textiles and apparel showed little variation and 
averaged about 26.5 percent. However, there was a sharp 
increase after 1981, increasing from 26.3 percent in 1981 
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to 40.8 percent by 1985. Now in 1987 the United States 
receives the largest share of developing country exports 
which is 58.9%. It also imports more apparel from 
developing country exporters than all other nations 
combined. The European Economic Community imports 22.7% 
of the developing country exports in 1987. This latter 
figure was once larger but due to a substantially more 
restrictive regime in 1983, the United States has 
absorbed a far higher proportion of developing country 
exports than the European Economic Community.[24] 
While there is no single cause behind the import 
surge beginning in 1983, the sharp appreciation of the 
dollar which began in 1981 can be pinpointed as one of 
the factors involved. While the dollar reached a peak in 
the first quarter of 1985, and has fallen since, import 
growth has continued, growing by 21 percent in real 
volume in 1986. These increases do not fit nicely with 
the exchange rate explanation. Furthermore, price 
effects of the strengthening dollar should not give rise 
to increased import volume under binding import quotas 
under the Multifiber Arrangement which will be discussed 
in detail in this study. 
The reality of the surge of imports from developing 
countries is evidenced by the textile trade deficit 
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statistics. The U.S. textile trade deficit was a 
disaster in 1982 and continued in the same pattern 
through 1987. In 1982, it was an estimated $7.4 billion, 
or 30% above the previous level in 1981.[25] This huge 
increase carried over into 1983 when according to the 
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, the textile and 
apparel trade deficit reached $9.4 billion which 
represented over ten percent of the country's total trade 
deficit.[26] Despite the apparent slowdown in the growth 
of the nation's overall trade deficit, the textile and 
apparel trade deficit soared 17% to a record-breaking 
$24.8 billion while exports from the same industry only 
totalled $4 billion for the year. At present, the 
textile and apparel trade deficit is 14.5 percent of the 
nation's overall trade deficit. Textile and apparel 
imports, measured in square yards, in 1987, hit a new 
peak of 13 million square yards, a 2.3 percent increase 
over 1986. These figures are further evidence that while 
the same developing countries flooding the United States 
with imports, they are also protecting their own textile 
markets by restricting the amount of imports into their 
own countries. The effect of these drastic increases are 
felt by the domestic companies and the average American 
worker. According to Robert Laidlaw, president of the 
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American Textile Manufacturer's Institute, a select group 
of countries which include the People's Republic of 
China, Mexico, India, Egypt, and Turkey have increased 
their shipments of textiles by 358 million square yards, 
which represents 36,000 lost job opportunities for U.S. 
workers.[27] Relating this loss of jobs for textile 
workers closer to the realm of this study, in the first 
six months of 1986, more than 3000 textile jobs were lost 
in North Carolina. From 1980 to 1986, at least 48,000 
textile jobs were lost in the State.[28] Of course, all 
of these jobs were not lost due only to the direct surge 
of imports into the United States. This import panademic 
has indirectly forced United States textile owners to 
invest in automated equipment and become a capital 
intensive industry rather than the labor intensive 
industry of the past century. 
After interviewing representatives of three national 
textile companies who have plants in North Carolina and 
surveying twelve others, there was sufficient evidence to 
indicate that foreign imports are the most prevalent 
problem facing thelong-range strategy of those companies. 
The larger companies have dealt with the import situation 
in order to remain profitable through various recovery 
means but for the smaller companies it has been difficult 
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to even survive. Some of the small, family-owned textile 
companies in North Carolina have gone out of business due 
to insufficient capital to implement a recovery plan as 
the larger companies have done. Out of fifteen textile 
companies who responded to a survey, one had liquidated 
in the past five years. It is difficult to determine the 
exact number who are no longer in business due to the 
size and closely-held characteristics of textile 
companies in North Carolina. Regardless of these 
figures, it is apparent that imports have and still are 
the major issue facing North Carolinian as well as 
American textile companies. The surge of imports into 
the United States has changed the industry or better yet, 
the industry has adapted in order to survive in this 
environment. A closer examination of the adaptations of 
the industry will be discussed in a later section of this 
study. In the interest of brevity in dealing with a 
discussion on the import situation, which is a monumental 
undertaking, this study will now reflect upon a third 
major factor in the condition of the textile industry: 
the role of government trade policy and import 
restrictions. 
23 
Government Role 
The role of government in any industry is a 
difficult issue to address. In the United States, the 
ideology of "free trade" has existed since the founding 
of this nation. Although this ideology is coincidental 
with the concepts of liberty and freedom, it also clashes 
with the "protectionist" trade ideology of many of our 
trading partners. While the United States has some trade 
policies and restrictions, they are inconsistent with the 
policies of their principal trading partners. The most 
liberal trade regimes are those of the United States and 
the European Economic Community which regulate imports 
pursuant to the international Multifiber Arrangement. 
Most other markets are heavily protected, and in many 
markets, textile and apparel imports are banned 
altogether.[29] 
The Multifiber Arrangement, passed in 1974 and 
renewed three times, has provided the framework for 
negotiating quotas with some twenty-for countries.[30J 
One of the problems within this agreement is that it does 
not include some of the most threatening exporting 
countries. Absent from the list is the People's Republic 
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of China, which grew seventy-three percent in textile and 
apparel exports in 1983 alone. Although textile 
executives and lobbyists argue that China should be 
subject to special import restrictions, federal policy 
has remained the same. It is interesting to note that 
Japan, which is one of the leading exporters of textiles 
to the United States, has elected to restrict textile and 
apparel imports outside the framework of the Multifiber 
Arrangement. Domestic producers in these countries can 
rely on a certain level of protection for their markets. 
Each country in the Multifiber Arrangement is 
allowed to formulate its own textile and apparel import 
regime, with certain specifications. Despite the system 
of global trade regulation, world exports of textiles 
from developing countries have increased at a rapid pace. 
In 1974, the first year of MFA, world exports from 
developing countries were $9.72 billion. By 1985, that 
figure had grown to $35.4 billion. Over 90% of this 
growth represents shipments to the United States and the 
European Economic Community in particular.[3l] 
Many textile executives feel that the Multifiber 
Arrangement has not worked for their industry in the 
United States. While the U.S. government has taken so-
called "protectionist" measures, other trading countries 
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have taken further action to protect their domestic 
markets. Also the United States has openly disregarded 
import controls under the MFA which has spawned a 
"disaproportionate and extremely disruptive flow of 
imports into the U.S." according to William Klopman, 
Burlington Industries former chairman and Chief executive 
officer.[32] An example of ineffective implementation of 
the MFA involves Thailand which overshipped its quota in 
1984 and 1985. Instead of holding the excess goods, the 
United States released them early and invoked no 
penalties to Thailand. 
An alternative to the Multifiber Arrangement is 
legislation. In 1985, Congress passed a Textile and 
Apparel Trade Enforcement Act which the President vetoed. 
The measure would have rolled back garment and fabric 
imports from major producing nations such as Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Korea, to 1980 levels as well as grant one 
percent increases in each of the years after 1984.[33] 
The Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987 which has not 
been enacted at this time, provided global quotas for 
imports from all countries and contained no 
rollbacks.[34] 
How the United States government should react to the 
import problem facing the textile industry is debatable. 
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Eleven companies out of fifteen in North Carolina that 
responded to a survey indicated that the government of 
the United States had a major role in determining the 
situation in the textile industry. Two of those companys 
felt that the government needs to enforce the present 
trade agreements, while one of these also felt that 
severe restrictions on imports would drive up the prices 
in our domestic markets in the long run. Nine out of the 
eleven indicated that government commitments to foreign 
countries need to be lowered, that enforcement of present 
trade regulations is necessary, and that even further 
restrictions should follow. According to Lawrence Leak 
president of Lawrence Knitting Mills, in Charlotte, North 
Carolina, the "government needs to further limit imports, 
force other countries to allow textiles to be imported or 
else not allow their textiles to be imported."[35] 
The present and some previous Administrations have 
chosen not to enforce some of the existing trade 
restricitions or to enact the Textile bills presented 
over the past few years. It can be speculated that one 
of the reasons for this is to keep the level of inflation 
down in this country. The Administration claims that the 
import problem is under control but the facts and 
statistics presented earlier are contradictory to this 
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claim. In order to further see how the economic 
conditions, imports, and government policy are affecting 
the textile industry in North Carolina, a brief overview 
of this industry will be given. 
Overview of North Carolina Textile Industry: 1970-1987 
As it has already been stated, there are 
approximately twelve hundred textile companies in North 
Carolina. Many of these are relatively small; owned and 
operated by families or partnerships. The larger 
companies, Burlington Industries, Westpoint Pepperell, J. 
P. Stevens, Milliken and Fieldcrest Cannon, to name a few, 
each specialize in certain products or target markets. 
There are many smaller companies who specialize, Kimbrell 
Parkdale, for instance, who specializes in combed cotton 
yarn for high quaility shirts and sheets; Dixie Yarns, who 
specialize in cotton thread and carpet yarn markets: Cone 
Mills, who focus on yarns for apparel 'and decorator and 
decorator fabrics; Macfield who specialize in yarns for 
industrial and home uses; and Glen Raven Mills who 
manufacture combed yarns, nylon yarns, and polyester yarns 
for industrial fabrics, luggage, and sportswear. Every 
company does not compete head on with every other textile 
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manufacturer-only those who specialize in the type of 
textile product. 
The U.S. textile industry reached a peak in 1973 
after a generation of growth. As new textile and apparel 
industries emerged in the Pacific rim countries and 
flooded the U.S. markets with their products, the domestic 
indutry suffered a major decline. The period from early 
1970 to 1983 was characterized by reduction in sales, high 
inventory levels, and lower productivity which eventually 
resulted in lost jobs, divestures of some businesses, and 
some liquidations for htose who could not absorb those 
I 
losses. 
Burlington Industries, J.P. Stevens, and Westpoint 
Pepperell all compete head to head in various market 
segments. All three at one time from the period 1970­
1987, were major producers of home furnishing products 
such as towels, sheets, and carpet. Westpoint Pepperell 
and Burlingotn also compete heavily in apparel products. 
The foregoing overview of Burlington Industries 
resulted from a personal interview with managing officer 
at the St. Pauls Plant in St. Pauls, North Carolina. 
Burlington Industries is the only one of the three major 
textile companies whose corporate office is located in 
North Carolina. Burlington is the nation's largest and 
most diversified manufacturer of textiles and related 
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products for apparel, the home, and industry. The company 
manufactures and merchandises apparel fabrics, yarns, 
carpets, rugs, draperies, bedspreads, automotive fabrics, 
and carpets and industries uses. Burlington operates 
approximately seventy plants in ten states and twelve 
plants in foreign countries. 
Sales for Burlington Industries in 1986 were $ 
2,778.1 million, which was a .9 % decrease from 1985 sales 
of $ 2,802.1 million. Inventories were in good balance 
with sales activity. There was a general improvement over 
conditions experienced in 1985 which resulted in less 
disruption of plant operating schedules and more efficient 
manufacturing performance, despite low operating rates. 
Burlington is the leader in most of the home 
furnishings markets in which it participates. These 
markets have been generally less affected by imports than 
the apparel markets. So the company is continuously 
introducing new products to improve its position and keep 
its share of the market. Burlington has established a 
position in the market with a focused approach on its home 
products, which has remained at about thirty percent of 
its total sales between the years of 1982 and 1986. 
Burlington's apparel products are also a major focus of 
production, constituting an average of about sixty percent 
of total sales between 1982 and 1986. Although industrial 
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fabrics only constitute about eleven percent of 1986's 
total sales, this a two percent growth from 1982. 
During the period from 1970 to 1983, Burlington, J.P. 
Stevens, and Westpoint Pepperell were severely affected by 
low price foreign competition imports, which came from 
labor-intensive industries, in which workers were paid 
anywhere from a quarter an hour to several dollars an 
hour. These three textile giants suffered losses in 
profits in some of the apparel market. Inventory levels 
built up to huge amounts while operating capacity had to 
be cut back. This resulted in thousands of lost jobs in 
North Carolina as has already been mentioned.[36] 
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Recovery Period: 1983-1987 
In order to escape from being taken over by foreign 
competition, the North Carolina textile industry 
launched a remarkable recovery plan in 1983 and 
still going on in 1987. J.P. Stevens, Burlington, and 
Westpoint Pepperell began as the leaders in this 
reconstruction effort through huge capital investments in 
machinery which allowed them to cut labor costs 
significantly, and through divestments of less profitable 
businesses, consolidation of plants, and customer service 
oriented programs. 
In 1986, J.P. Stevens completed a three-year 
restructing of their company which involved capital 
expenditures for plant modernizations in 1985 of $ 45.4 
million and $ 62.2 million in 1986. Over $ 30 million of 
these huge capital outlays in 1986 were concentrated in 
Steven's home fashion textiles such as bathroom and 
kitchen towels, $19 million was spent on industrial 
products, and only about $ 7 mililion was spent on the 
apparel division. These capital investments were used to 
upgrade machinery and implement. new tachnology. In 
Wagram,N.C., J.P. Stevens operates a plant which has been 
called the most modern facility for terry towel production 
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in the wor1d.[37] 
Stevens has chosen a focused business strategy to 
compete with imports through the expansion of the 
furnishings divisions. In order to accomplish this, they 
have also divested in the Woolen & Worsted Fabrics 
Divisions in a leveraged buyout of about $ 500,000 worth 
of apparel products. Stevens has executed a total 
refocusing of the corporation in which the elimination of 
the finished apparel divisions will occur. Senior 
mangement at Stevens fells that the current and future 
growth propects for textiles is in the home furnishings 
businesses. This has been brought about by a social 
movement in which more people are now staying at home for 
entertainment and relaxation. This will increase the 
demand for products to decorate the home. Through this 
type of market focus, Stevens can be a customer-service 
oriented company through quality products at a lower 
price. Stevens was the leader in the development of 
collection programs which a marketing campaign through the 
use of designer labels on towels and home products. David 
Tracey, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of J.P. 
Stevens was responsible for the implementation of these 
collection programs. In an interview with Mr. Tracey, 
was surprised to learn that J.P. Stevens towels carry the 
names of designers such as Ralph Lauren, Collier Campbell, 
I 
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and Amy Vanderbilt. Since foreign competition had 
captured about eighteen percent of the towel business in 
America since 1983~ Stevens recognized the necessity of a 
plan to retaliate. Through a quality~ brand-name towel 
focus~ the foreign competition will only be able to 
capture a portion of the cheap towel market. In 1970, the 
amount of imported towels was not enough to record. 
In 1987, foreign competition had captured 17-18% of the 
towel market.[381 
At Burlington Industries, $1.5 million was invested 
in just one automated piece of equipment in order to 
modernize a plant. The yarn winding department is one of 
the most modern in the world which consisits of Mirada 
winders, purchased from Japan in order to speed production 
time. The Pronto System is a material handling system 
used by Burlington to cut down on manhandling through 
electronic devices.[391 At Fieldcrest Cannon, $11 million 
was invested in machinery and improvements for one 
pillowcase and sheet plant in Concord, North Carolina.[40] 
Kimbrell of Gastonia, North Carolina, was the first 
specialized yarnmaker in the U.S. to buy West German open­
end spinning technology. By continuously introducing 
updated versions of the new technology, Kimbrell has cut 
labor costs by fifty percent.[41] 
According to Bob Holroyd~ General Manager of the Yarn 
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Division at Westpoint Pepperell, serving the customer has 
been Westpoint's key element in a restructuring program. 
Lead times have been improved which allows the product to 
be delivered faster than offshore competition. Westpoint 
has also spent millions of dollars on knitting machines 
which allow two and one half times the previous 
production capability. 
The American textile industry is now considered by 
many to be the most efficient in the world. By 
comparison, Japanese mills are only 74% as productive as 
American mills and mills in Hong Kong are only 50% as 
productive. With these advances though, has followed a 
decline in employment in the textile industry. In 1982, 
there were 282,900 textile workers in the state and in 
1983 there were 228,000. Burlington Industries, for 
example, reported that it has increased its capacity from 
$2.7 billion to $3.8 billion while reducing its number of 
employees from a 1973 high of 88,000 to 53,000 in 
1982.[42] Although employment has suffered, most of the 
larger companies who have automated have retrained their 
workers for the skilled, high-tech labor required for the 
operation of new machinery. In some instances, the 
modernizations have created more jobs since the expansion 
allows more people to work. 
For the smaller North Carolina manufacturer, the 
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modernized equipment has been difficult to obtain. The 
lack of capital to invest in multi-million dollar robotics 
and computerized knitting and weaving equipment has forced 
the smaller manufacturers of yarn to take a decrease in 
profits in order to survive. Consolidations with other 
small companies has been one way to survive. Those who 
have developed a strategy of targeting a niche in the 
market, investing as much as possible in the latest 
machinery to make them more productive, and cutting costs 
to the bone. All of these efforts are in hopes of 
dominating that niche eventually. 
Even the dominant companies are resorting to mergers 
and takeovers in order to build a domestic textile empire 
that forign competition will not stand a chance against. 
Recently, Burlington Industries merged with Morgan Stanley 
Financial Corporation to avoid a harsh takeover attempt by 
Dominion Textiles. In another takeover attempt, Westpoint 
Pepperell recently has offered to purchase all of J.P. 
Stevens shares in order to build a major textile empire. 
Westpoint Pepperell's senior management feels that a 
"marriage" of J.P. Stevens and Westpoint Pepperell is in 
order to stop foreign competition from successfully taking 
over the greater portion of the markets in the United 
States.[43] 
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Future Outlook: 1987-2000 
After extensive research of the past and present 
conditions of the textile industry in North Carolina and 
examination of the major factors affecting the industry, 
the conclusion of this study involves three elements. 
First, the general outlook for the textile industry in 
North Carolina for the next ten to fifteen years is rather 
favorable; second, huge capital investments in robotics 
and computerized machinery will continue to take place; 
and third, mergers of major textile giants will likely 
occur. 
According to ten out of the fifteen companies 
surveyed, small and large alike, the overall outlook seems 
to be favorable; although several of these ten did 
indicate that a positive outlook was dependent on certain 
factors. These factors involve the passing of the trade 
bill, the constant checking of imports, and the ability to 
generate enough capital for further modernization of 
plants. 
To stimulate growth in the textile industry, the 
enactment of some form of the textile bill would give the 
industry the support needed for further recovery plans. 
Present trade regulations need to be enforced as well as 
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further restrictions with the developing countries. 
It appears that large capital outlays 
necessary for updating plants with the latest technology 
will continue to be a major strategy for textile 
companies. As technology expands, so will the amount of 
profits poured into investment in machinery. In the 
future, more funds will be allocated to the research an 
development df new marketing campaigns like the collection 
programs as well as customer service improvement processes 
such as Quick Response programs to meet customer's needs 
faster. 
Mergers and acquisitions will playa major role in 
restructuring the entire industry. It will become a 
global market industry in which only the strong will 
survive. The strong companies will get stronger and the 
weak will get weaker. At this point, there will be less 
inter U.S. competition with a shifted emphasis to global 
competition. The entire industry may become a segmented 
business-oriented industry in which the dominant companies of 
each geographic area will target a specific market. 
It is the opinion of this researcher that the 
performance of the textile industry overall will be 
improved significantly within ten years. This 
performance, though, may be the result of liquidations of 
small companies and the loss jobs by many as the 
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productivity levels is increased through more extensively 
automated equipment. Many companies may suffer from the 
huge investments of profits into plant modernizations in 
the short term, but the long term advantages will be 
profitable. 
As for the North Carolina textile industry, there 
will remain a select group of relatively small yarn and 
thread spinners and dyers. These businesses have survived 
their roughest period and will probably continue to survive 
as long as they can afford the new technology. As has 
already been mentioned, it is the larger textile 
operations who manufacture the finished products for the 
home and industry who will consolidate and become 
subjected to a restructured global market by the year 
2000. 
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